As a philosopher of science, I investigate the interface between abstract ideas (e.g. concepts like cognition or values like objectivity) and technical systems (e.g. theories, models, AI systems). My focus has been on the cognitive sciences, which incorporate elements from psychology, neuroscience, artificial intelligence, medicine, linguistics, biology, and anthropology.
In my current work at Trilateral, I am contributing to AI ethics projects, including practical recommendations for developing ethical and explainable AI (XAI), AI Act compliance, and impact assessments. I also contribute to the delivery of European Commission research projects, including the EURMARS Project.
As a philosopher, I am especially interested in the ways that people use concepts and specialized terminology. Many theoretically and practically important concepts in the sciences—such as cognition, representation, consciousness, disease, and microaggression—have contested or inconsistent uses. I write about some of the ways that special care is required when scientific terminology is contested: examining ways that contested terminology is actually used in the sciences, and developing techniques to model those uses.
Much of my research so far has focused on the scientific concept of cognition—the category that denotes the subject matter of the cognitive sciences. Whereas various others have defended specific accounts of cognition, I argue that we are better served by an ecumenical approach that describes the existing variation in the ways specialists use the term “cognition,” rather than correcting or regimenting such variation. The ecumenical approach has various advantages over more common “sectarian” approaches. In particular, an ecumenical account of cognition can provide better resources for introducing novices to the field, and more flexible models of scientific assumptions or theories about the mind. I also defend a specific ecumenical account—the “Sensitive Management Hypothesis”—which can provide a better framework for thinking about cognition. The Sensitive Management Hypothesis is based on an unusual sort of conceptual analysis, which I call “modular analysis,” that can supply ecumenical models of contested concept use.
I also examine terms, like “microaggression,” that have double lives in science (particularly in psychology) and in critical theory. I’ve written about how ambiguity causes confusion among consciousness researchers, and I have examined various uses of the microaggression concept (with Frederick W. Gooding, Jr.), distinguishing between “explanatory” and “hermeneutical” uses of the term. I am currently investigating how microaggressions can be reconceptualized to better support research about public health.
See more about my papers and projects on the “publications” page.
